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Introduction
It is increasingly apparent, and equally inevitable, that the tough questions
arising out of the allocation of income and deductions between related tax-
payers residing in different countries have become more acute. The tax
authorities of each country responsible for collecting revenue understandably
want to get their fair slice of the pie. In the United States, the knife used to cut
the pie is section 482, labeled by one commentator as "an in terrorem provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code. . . ." Although that provision has been
around since 1928, the IRS only began to use it aggressively in the interna-
tional field in the 1960s.2 That other major industrial countries now want to
put a knife in the pie is only natural. To fail to do so would be to acquiesce in a
distortion of the revenue base.3 The lost revenue potential is significant. Of ad-
justments made by the IRS in 1968 and 1969, for example, the average for a
pricing misallocation was $1,796,000 per adjustment. 4 Obviously the impact of
such a tax adjustment on an individual corporation can be dramatic.
Moreover, the correlative adjustment of the foreign tax situation may no
longer be possible.'
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The purpose of this article is to examine the equivalent French provision,
Article 57 of the Code Gdndral des Imp6ts, and to compare in a general way
the tests applied by the respective taxing authorities of the two countries.6
France now follows the United States, Japan, and West Germany as the fourth
industrial power in the free world. It is, moreover, moving rapidly towards a
tax system similar to our own. And there are scattered signs indicating that a
more vigorous protection of the tax base can be expected.'
In the area of allocation of income and deductions, legal counsel in France is
considerably hindered by the paucity of published guidelines. Even in the
United States, where the rules have evolved further, there has been "a con-
tinuous stream of comment and criticism from the U.S. business com-
munity." ' Criteria have tended to a high degree of generality. Most cases seem
to be settled in the United States, not on the basis of an application of the
Regulations, but "on what would be termed a 'horsetrade' basis." 9 In France
the difficulties of offering legal counsel are even more acute and call for not
only a knowledge of the relevant case law, which is sparse, and the single
general instruction issued by the French tax authorities," but a sensitivity to,
and awareness of, underlying local and national economic realities. In this
respect, advising in this area often seems more akin to offering antitrust
counsel than tax counsel. The rules are amorphous, uncertain, mercurial, and
the stakes high. It is within this framework that one must examine the French
allocation problem known in France under the name of the indirect transfer of
profits.
Statutory Framework
Indirect transfer of profits are subject to a three-pronged fiscal attack under
Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, Article 57 of the French Code
G~n~ral des Imp6ts (made applicable to French corporations by Articles 209
6The only significant commentary in English on Article 57 that has appeared to date appears to
be the discussion included in the World Tax Series of the Harvard Law School, Taxation in France§§ 1l1/2.6b and Shifting of Profits from and to Foreign Subsidiaries, 13 EUROPEAN TAXATION 265
(1972); See also Lefebvre, Taxes in France § 221 (1977) and Madere, International Pricing: Alloca-
tion Guidelines and Relief from Double Taxation, 10 TEXAS INT. L. J. 108 (1975). Lefebvre gives a
good introductory survey of the French tax system. Madere discusses the Section 482 equivalent
provisions in various countries including France. For further recent discussion see International
Taxation and Transfer Pricing, 1976 CORPORATION LAW INSTITUTE, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, pp. 161-189 (1977).
'Law N' 1234 of December 29, 1976 taxing persons fiscally domiciled in France on worldwide
income is only the most visible and perhaps dramatic of recent moves.
'Kauder, supra note 3 at 23. See also Bischel, supra note 5 at 515.
'Kragen, supra note I at n. 17.
I°Note of 4 May 1973, B.O.D.G.I., N ° 82, May 9, 1973.
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and 221)," and Article 8 of the U.S.-French double taxation treaty of 28 July
1967. 1 It is useful to look at the language of each of these provisions to ap-
preciate the scope and discretion that they confer upon the tax authorities of
the two countries:
Article 57. For the establishment of income tax due by enterprises which are in a
position of dependence on or which possess the Control of an enterprise located out-
side of France, profits indirectly transferred to the latter, either by increasing or
decreasing the purchase or selling price or by any other means, are reintegrated in
the final accounting. It shall be the same in respect to enterprises which are in a
position of dependance on another enterprise or on a group of enterprises holding
as well the control of enterprises located outside of France.
In the absence of specific data for accomplishing the reintegration, the taxable
income shall be determined by comparison with similar enterprises normally
managed.' 3
Section 482. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers. In any case
of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated,
whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) own-
ed or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary . . . may
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses.
Article 8. Related persons (1) Where a resident of a Contracting State and a resi-
dent of the other Contracting State are related and where such related persons
make arrangements or impose conditions between themselves which are different
from those which would be made between independent persons, then any income
which would, but for those arrangements or conditions, have accrued to the resi-
dent of the first Contracting State but, by reason of those arrangements or condi-
tions, has not so accrued, may be included in the income of the resident of the first
Contracting state . . .and taxed accordingly.
The legislative history shows that Article 8 was simply meant to be a treaty
analogue to section 482, and it will not be discussed further here. No reported
cases appear to have occurred under it, either in the United States or in France,
"In certain instances involving countries having a privileged fiscal relationship with France Art.
238A of the CGI is also relevant. It will not be discussed here as Art. 57 is sufficiently broad to
cover the problem.
"Convention between the United States of America and the French Republic with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Property, 19 UST 5280, TIAS 6518.
"The translation is the author's. The French text is as follows:
Article 57. Pour l'6tablissement de l'imp6t sur le revenu d par les entreprises qui sont sous la
d~pendance ou qui poss6dent le controle d'entreprises situ6es hors de France, les bdnkfices in-
directement transf~r6s A ces derniers, soit par voie de majoration ou de diminution des prix
d'achat ou de vente, soit par tout autre moyen, sont incorpor~s aux r~sultats accuses par les
comptabilit~s. Il est proc6d6 de meme A l'6gard des entreprises qui sont sous la d~pendance
d'une entrepris6 ou d'un groupe poss6dant 6galement le controle d'entreprises situes hors de
France.
A d~faut d'6lments precis pour oprer les redressements ... les produits imposables sont
d6termin6s par comparison avec ceux des entreprises similaires exploit6es normalement.
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probably because the administrative authorities of both countries prefer to
utilize the respective clauses of their own tax codes, that is, Article 57 or sec-
tion 482.
Enforcement Framework
Two final provisions should be kept in view prior to discussing the above
provisions: Article 27 of the U.S.-French treaty of 1967 specifically provides
that "The two Contracting States undertake to lend assistance and support to
each other in the collection of the taxes to which the present Convention
relates" and Article 26(1) states that "The competent authorities of the Con-
tracting States shall exchange such information as is pertinent to carrying out
the provisions of this Convention or preventing fraud or fiscal evasion in rela-
tion to the taxes which are the subject of this Convention." A recent U.S.
federal appellate court decision interpreted an analogous article in the U.S.-
Canadian tax treaty to mean that the Canadian government can utilize the en-
forcement machinery of the IRS to enforce a, purely Canadian tax obligation
against a Canadian company. United States v. Burbank and Co. '4 Thus, under
both the treaty provisions and the Burbank case, the French tax authorities can
obtain access to corporate documents and all necessary information that it
might need to determine if any indirect transfer of profits by a French com-
pany has occurred.
General Guidelines
For Article 57 to be invoked by the tax authorities two requirements must
first be met:
(1) There must be a link of dependency between the French company and the
foreign company. The link can be either a formal, legal link or simply a
factual link, such as the same people involved in both companies,
although no legal ties bind them. This link of dependency ("liens de
d6pendance") ordinarily is not difficult to discern and will not be
discussed further here. Normally it can be assumed as one of the obvious
parameters of the problem.
(2) There must be an indirect transfer abroad of profits not arising out of
the normal management of a company ("transfert indirect de b~neficies
h l'tranger ne televant pas de la gestion normale de l'6ntreprise."
These indirect transfers can occur through any one of five methods set forth
by the French administration:' 5
(a) increasing or decreasing the purchase or sale price,
"525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. den. 97 Sup. Ct. 2647 (1976).
'Note of 4 May 1973, supra note 10.
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(b) excessive royalties or royalties without consideration,
(c) no interest or low interest loans,
(d) cancellation of interest due under a loan agreement or cancellation of
debt, and
(e) conferring benefits out of proportion to the service or performance
received.
The French administration lists these methods for illustrative purposes and
does not feel limited by them. In any event, they would appear broad enough
to cover most indirect transfers.
Presumption of Indirect Transfer
Of major importance to the application of Article 57 is the use of a
presumption by the French Administration which turns not upon the intent
behind the transfer of profits, but upon the existence of advantages accorded
by a French company to a foreign company. If the Administration concludes
that such advantages exist, then there automatically arises a rebuttable
presumption that there has been an indirect transfer of profits, and the Ad-
ministration accordingly can invoke Article 57. Unless the company can rebut
the presumption by specific evidence that the transfer was for sound and nor-
mal business reasons, the government wins its case by virtue of the presump-
tion.
Allocation and Penalties
The profits that were indirectly transferred are reintegrated into the com-
pany's income. There is also potential liability for tax fraud under Article 1741
of the French Tax Code which carries a penalty of 5000 to 30,000 francs and
can be accompanied by one to five years imprisonment. If the tax fraud occurs
through the use of false, absent, or inaccurate invoices, the fine can be 5000 to
100,000 francs, and imprisonment for two to five years.
Existence of Advantages and
Pertinent Case Law
The vagueness of the test phrased in terms of "the existence of advan-
tages"' 6 makes it a potentially lethal weapon in the hands of the tax
authorities. It should also be noted that the transfer of "advantages" could
encompass the shifting of losses, although Article 57 itself speaks only of prof-
its.
"Dictionnaire Joly, SocitisAnonymes T-3, S~rie A, Imp&s sur Bnffices § 13, Feuillet N' 21.
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The statutory language calls for a comparison of taxable income of other
companies similarly situated and managed normally. The theory used by the
Administration is "the act of abnormal managpment" ("l'acte de gestion
mal"). If there are other companies in France to which the corporation in
question can be compared, this is surely the route the tax administration will
follow. However, the law, at least by implication, does allow the company to
show that there exist sound business reasons for the transfer. If, for example, a
French firm pays to a foreign subsidiary sums which it fixes annually,
unilaterally and at its discretion, and the transferor is unable to show that the
sums were in payment of services actually rendered, then the sums have been
reintegrated into income pursuant to Article 57.1'
The critical presumption of an indirect transfer in violation of Article 57
also comes into play as soon as a no interest or a low interest loan is involved.'
The same presumption occurs if interest normally due is not demanded in pay-
ment. Again, the threory is that such a course of action is not a normal part of
management in a commercial context. However, the Conseil d'Etat has per-
mitted no-interest loans between a parent corporation and a subsidiary, and
rejected the tax authorities invocation of Article 57, when the subsidiary had
serious financial difficulties which would have jeopardized the credit rating of
the parent corporation and caused problems more serious than the loss of in-
terest. ' I
The Conseil d'Etat has accepted the principle of a fixed sum paid by one
related corporation to another to offset promotional expenses or other ex-
penses. 0 The rub is that the fee must not exceed that which would be "normal-
ly due." It is not entirely clear under the existing law whether "normally due"
refers to what would be due between unrelated companies or whether the
transferor can legitimately take into consideration the fact of association and
the financial strength of its subsidiary, as in the no-interest loan for a finan-
cially weak subsidiary cited above and approved by the Conseil d'Etat in 1967.
Logically, the test should apply to fixed sums paid to offset promotional and
other expenses as well as to loans. Prudence, however, would suggest that logic
is a dangerous guide in this area. The least dangerous path, as indicated by the
case law, is to divide common expenses as a function of gross sales of the sub-
sidiary over gross sales of the entire family of companies. 2 ' This is not always a
useful method, and it is not the only one permitted. What would appear to be
"C.E. 22 Dec. 1958, NO 40337 to 40341. See Lefebvre, IMPOTs DIRECTS, VOL. 11, BIC XVII § 50
(15 Oct. 1975).
"Lefebvre, Id. at § 51.
"C.E. 13 Jan. 1967, NO 68139.
'
0 C.E. 8 May 1944, NO 66968 and 68362. See LEFEBVRE, supra note 17 at § 52b.
"C.E. 25 April 1960, NO 45089.
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critical is that there be a fair relationship between the transfer and the benefits
received.
Ambiguity of Normal Management Test
The test employed by the French tax authorities and by the case law seems to
return to the concept of "normal management." What is unclear-and
critical-is whether the fact that the companies are related can be taken into
consideration to determine what is "normal management." Neither the in-
stitutions and interpretations of the French tax administration, nor the French
case law on the subject, nor the principal French tax treatises and looseleaf ser-
vices directly confront this ambiguity.
This ambiguity in fact gives rise to two separate theories of the multinational
company: (1) "The separate entity theory views each of a MNC's subsidiaries
which carry on business of a continuing and substantial nature as separate and
independent entities." while "The unitary entity theory . . . views a group of
affiliates as a single business which for reasons of legal convenience is divided
into purely formal, separately-incorporated subsidiaries." 22
Obviously the test of what is normal management will differ according to
the theory adopted. Under the separate entity theory it would be to maximize
profits for the entity in question, whereas under the unitary entity theory it
would be to maximize overall profits of the entire business group. Under this
latter theory, indirect transfer of profits to minimize taxes and assist new sub-
sidiaries in getting started could certainly not be considered abnormal acts of
business management. But of course they are so considered both by the French
and U.S. tax authorities. It is clear that, by and large, the tax administration
and the courts adhere to the "separate entity theory."
Arm's Length Test in the United States
To appreciate the probable scope and trend of the French law, it is useful to
look at some of the various tests applied by the IRS and the American case
law:
1. Does the transfer price clearly reflect income? The regulations provide
three specific methods of testing this in intercompany sale of goods situa-
tions, which will not be discussed here.
2. Are the business activities legitimate, that is, is there a legitimate business
purpose?
"Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation under Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1205 (1976).
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3. Is tax avoidance one of the purposes?
4. What percentage of total MNC income is the subsidiary receiving and
how does it compare to its percentage of total MNC capital?
5. What percentage of total MNC payroll does the subsidiary have and how
does it compare to subsidiary income as a percentage of MNC income?
The second test should be singled out because while the question of
legitimate business purposes is raised, the general rule under section 482 in the
United States is that transfer price manipulations will not be excused by the ex-
istence of a legitimate business purpose. (Reg. section 1.482-1(c); Eli Lilly and
Co. v. United States, 2). The decision of the French Conseil d'Etat, the highest
court in tax matters, in 1967 clearly disagrees. There the court approved the
no-interest loan to its financially troubled subsidiary.
Even in the United States the situation is not quite as clear as the Eli Lilly
case would have it. In that case the court specifically stated: "The thrust of
section 482 is to put controlled taxpayers on a parity with uncontrolled tax-
payers.""4 But the direction of the law is clear enough: "the decisions evidence
a distinct historical trend from a test of 'reasonableness' of the profits
reported by each entity to a strict 'arm's length' test of what the profits of each
entity would have been if they were unrelated parties bargaining with each
other."'" In the words of another commentator: "Intercompany prices must
be set for section 482 purposes at levels which would have been charged
unrelated parties in comparable arm's length transactions .... Moreover, it
will be no defence to a charge of non-arm's length pricing that the deviation
from arm's length was inadvertent, . . . or that no income is realized from a
transaction by other members of the controlled group .... "16 The Regula-
tions define an "arm's length" charge for services rendered as "the amount
which was charged or would have been charged for the same or similar services
in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar
circumstances considering all relevant facts." 2
The Arm's Length Test can probably be safely considered as the American
test. In the author's opinion, it will be adopted as well by the French ad-
ministration and French courts and will emerge as the French test as well, but
at the present time it would, in light of the case law, be an exaggeration to call
it the applicable French Law. It is one boundary of the French test but not all
of it. Obviously if the Arm's Length Test can be met, the French administra-
23372 F.2d 990, 999 (Ct. CI. 1967).
"Id. at
"GIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 86 (Tax Management, 1974).
"Note, supra note 22 at 1213, n. 53.
"Reg. § 1.482-b(b)(3).
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tion will be satisfied, but if it is not met, it might still be satisfied, if it can be
shown that the transfer involved did not arise out of abnormal or suspect
management practices. The French test hence might be labeled the Act of Ab-
normal Management Test (l'acte de gestion anormal) with the French tax ad-
ministration looking principally, but not only, to the consideration of whether
parties acting at arm's length would have acted the same way.
Arm's Length Test v. Golden Egg Strategy
Handling intercompany arrangements and transfers, to the extent possible,
as if the companies were not related, and hence dealing at arm's length, has
much to commend it as a long-term policy of a multinational company. It is
apt (1) substantially to reduce legal fees and costs over a period of years, (2) to
save a substantial amount of management time, and (3) to give a more ac-
curate picture of the return on capital. 8 To suggest such a policy by no means
undercuts all the advantages of a multinational enterprise.29
The arm's length test was also embraced by the United Nations in its Report
of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Cor-
porations on Development and on International Relations. 30 It recommended
this test whenever possible home and host countries should enforce arm's length
pricing. In the United States, for example, "a significant portion (more than a
quarter of United States exports by some estimates) of international trade has
been transferred from 'arm's length' to intra-enterprise transaction," 3' and
this has led to an increasing use of section 482 by the IRS.
There are also presently attempts under way to formulate some sort of a
multilateral treaty to govern the conduct of multinational companies," but the
conclusion of such a treaty is probably at least several years away. However,
the lack of a treaty will not prevent individual countries from trying to enforce
the arm's length standard, as the United States is already trying to do.
Opposing the arm's length test as a long-term corporate policy is the
"golden egg strategy." It is to resist vigorously every infringement and restric-
29"The operation of arbitrary displacement of profit from one company to another obscures
judgment of the true return on capital in any one company and may be counter-productive." TIN-
DALL, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, p. 285 (Oceana, 1975).
2"The essence of the MNC is, in some sense, that it combines-besides capital, management
and technology-a web of marketing ties which gives it a competitive edge over economic rivals."
Grayson, L.E., The Means of Regulation of Multinational Corporations in THE FUTURE OF THE
UNITED STATES MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION, p. 142, Unterman and Swent eds. (U. Press of Va.
1975). See generally Perlmutter, Perplexing Routes to M.N.E. Legitimacy: Codes of Conduct for
Technology Transfer, STANFORD J. INT. STUDIES, XI, 169-199 (Spring, 1976).
"New York, United Nations, 1974, E/550/Add. 1, pp. 73-75.
"See Rubin, The Longer Range Political Role of the Multinational Corporation, in GLOBAL
COMPANIES, G.W. Ball ed., p. 133 (Prentice Hall, 1975).
"See Rostow, Nye, and Ball, The Needfor InternationalArrangements, GLOBAL COMPANIES, id. at 156.
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tion of the host government and "seek to prove that the goose roasted is worth
less than the goose laying golden eggs." 33
This is a more adventurous policy. If a company's economic weight in the
community is heavy enough and the profits important enough, such a policy
may be justified. While the factors leading to the decision turn on an evalua-
tion of legal considerations, the decision itself is an economic one, at least as
long as laws are not flouted and nonfrivolous arguments can be advanced in
support of a particular allocation.
"Nye and Rubin, supra note 31 at 141.
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